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Do managers' personal traits matter? A burgeoning recent literature provides ample
evidence that individual CEO characteristics impact corporate policies (e.g., see Bertrand and
Schoar (2003), Malmendier and Tate (2005)).1 One of the key dimensions of heterogeneity is
dierence in risk attitudes. Such heterogeneity can have important real consequences insofar
as it drives corporate investment and R&D activities. But are the dierences in risk attitudes
permanent, or do they vary over an individual's life-cycle in a predictable way? In this paper,
we investigate the role of CEOs' marital status on corporate risk-taking via its eect on the
strength of relative wealth concerns.
Relative wealth concerns impact nancial decisions by altering individuals' attitudes to-
wards risk. We focus on CEOs, whose preferences are likely to be reected in corporate
investment and nancial policies, to the extent that CEO wealth is tied to their rms' nan-
cial performance through incentive pay or changes in the value of their human capital. CEO
decisions involve large nancial stakes and have potentially broad-ranging impact on other
agents.2 If status concerns inuence such decisions, this would represent strong evidence
that they are an important factor aecting risk-taking. Furthermore, if status is particu-
larly important for wealthier individuals, as argued by Becker, Murphy, and Werning (2005)
and Roussanov (2010a), focusing on a group of individuals who disproportionately represent
the upper end of the wealth distribution should help detect the impact of such concerns on
nancial decisions.
Following Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001), we develop a model in which concern
for relative position arises endogenously from competition for mates in the marriage mar-
ket. Standard arguments lead to positively assortative matching in marriage markets (e.g.,
1Benmelech and Frydman (2012), Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011), and Schoar and Zuo (2011) trace
the impact of the CEOs' earlier life experiences on rm policies and performance. Kaplan, Klebanov, and
Sorensen (2008) examine the role of particular types of managerial skills of the prospective CEOs, whereas
Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) and Morse, Nanda, and Seru (2011) focus on the concentration of
decision-making power in the hands of the CEOs. Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2006) and
Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2007) use Scandinavian data to identify exogenous
shocks to CEO appointment and termination based on life events. Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2011) directly
measure behavioral traits of CEOs and link them to rm actions.
2Following Malmendier and Tate (2005), a number of authors have shown that managers exhibiting over-
condent behavior engage in more risk-taking - e.g., see Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007). Theoreti-
cally, overcondent managerial behavior may be optimal from the rm's standpoint, as explored by Gervais
and Goldstein (2007), Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2011), and Goel and Thakor (2008). Empirically, Hirsh-
leifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) show that managers who exhibit overcondent behavior are more successful in
pursuing innovation.
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Becker (1973)). In particular, higher wealth individuals are likely to be matched with mates
who are highly desirable, in terms of their wealth or other relevant characteristics.3 As long
as the status payo { i.e., the improvement in the potential quality of the marital match
{ raises the benet of an extra dollar of wealth (beyond its pure consumption value), the
matching environment creates an incentive for agents to take more idiosyncratic risk than
they would in the absence of the status contest. Since changing mates over time is costly,
married individuals will exhibit weaker concern for relative wealth position, all else equal.
Thus, our model predicts that single individuals, who are presumably expecting to compete
for mates in the future, should have a greater tolerance for risk than married ones, and con-
sequently undertake riskier investments. More specically, single individuals should assume
more idiosyncratic (as opposed to systematic) risk, as such risk makes it more likely they will
rank above their peers, and consequently nd higher quality mates. Moreover, since wealth
and spouse quality are complements in our model, it implies that competition for mates is
particularly intense at the top of the wealth distribution, making it particularly suitable for
understanding the risk-taking behavior of wealthy individuals such as corporate CEOs.
We test this prediction empirically using a standard sample of U.S. public rms, aug-
mented with a new data set on the marital status of CEOs that we compile from a variety
of public sources. We nd that companies run by CEOs classied as single in our data set
exhibit higher levels of stock return volatility and pursue more aggressive investment poli-
cies than otherwise comparable rms, consistent with the hypothesis of greater risk-taking
by single managers. These eects are both economically and statistically quite meaningful.
A rm run by a single CEO, controlling for a variety of personal and rm characteristics,
exhibits stock return volatility that is 3% higher, and invests 10% more on average.
As predicted by the model, the dierence in volatilities represents varying exposures to
idiosyncratic rather than systematic risk. The investment policies vary with marital status
for capital expenditures, as well as R&D spending and acquisitions, which are commonly
associated with risk-taking. The eect of marital status is weaker for older managers, which
is consistent with our theory, as they are less likely to be competing in the marriage market.
3Charles, Hurst, and Killewald (2011) present evidence of positive marital sorting based on parental
wealth. Chiappori, Orece, and Quintana-Domeque (2012) estimate a model of marital matching in which
both income/education and physical attributes of a spouse enter into individual's preferences.
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Importantly, we control for rm characteristics in our analysis, so that our ndings do not
simply reect the tendency of single CEOs to be matched with riskier rms. If we omit
rm controls, the relationship between marital status and risk-taking becomes signicantly
stronger, suggesting that single CEOs indeed are more likely to run relatively risky rms.
Moreover, we demonstrate that single CEOs impact rm investment decisions by exploiting
within-rm variation in idiosyncratic return volatility over time. We show that while married
CEOs reduce investment in response to an increase in idiosyncratic risk (consistent with
Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012)), those CEOs who are single do not, conrming that they
are less averse to (idiosyncratic) risk. The latter result is based on within-rm variation
in idiosyncratic volatility, and therefore cannot be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity
driving dierences in investment rates across rms.
These results support the hypothesis that single CEOs assume more risk than married
ones, and are consistent with our model of CEO status-seeking that is motivated by the
desire to nd a suitable marriage partner. However, it is also possible that single managers
exhibit dierent risk-taking behavior from married managers even absent status concerns.
Individuals who are single at a given age may be inherently more risk-tolerant than those
who are married by the same age. It is important to emphasize here that, at least in the
simplest portfolio allocation models, more risk-tolerant individuals assume more systematic
rather than more idiosyncratic risk, as the latter is not priced in equilibrium and thus is
not associated with higher expected returns. Our nding that single CEOs are associated
with rms taking on more idiosyncratic risk is therefore not immediately consistent with
the innate heterogeneity hypothesis, unless rms have access to idiosyncratic investment
technologies that earn positive abnormal returns due to market incompleteness (and CEOs
are able to perfectly hedge their aggregate risk exposures, as in Acharya and Bisin (2009)). To
further distinguish our explanation from the alternative of innate heterogeneity, we employ
an instrumental variable approach.
Our instrument exploits the variation in divorce laws across dierent states in the U.S.,
which is very plausibly exogenous to the CEO-rm match and to rms' investment policies.
Our basic assumption is that divorce costs should inuence an individual's propensity to
get married. One aspect of these costs, which should be of particular concern for wealthy
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individuals, is the division of marital property. We therefore distinguish between states
where this division is determined by the community property standard and those where it is
determined by the equitable distribution standard. The former mandates equal division of
assets acquired during marriage between the two divorcing spouses, whereas the latter allows
the division to be determined by a judge based on a range of factors, including the relative
contributions of the spouses. It is commonly understood that community property is more
advantageous for the poorer spouse (e.g., Voena (2011)). Since a CEO should rarely be in this
position, he or she should nd divorce costlier in community property states. Consequently,
all else equal, a CEO working in such a state should be less likely to be married at a given point
in time, waiting for a higher quality match. Indeed, this hypothesis is strongly conrmed by
the data.
We also provide evidence that a similar pattern holds in the broader U.S. population, but
only for wealthier individuals, exactly as our hypothesis implies. This evidence helps validate
our instrumental variables approach, as it indicates that the observed eect of community
property regime on marital status is unlikely to just reect other dierences across states,
such as income distribution, culture, or religion. Crucially, when we use the state divorce
law as an instrument for marital status, all our ndings continue to hold (and are actually
stronger), suggesting the relation between marital status and risk-taking is not simply driven
by innate dierences between CEOs who are likely to be single single or married.
In addition to status concerns, our results are also consistent with the hypothesis that
marriage changes CEO preferences (i.e., it is not the case that married CEOs are innately
dierent than single ones, but that marriage itself changes them). Changing marital status
can aect an individual's preferences in a number of ways. Preferences of a married CEO may
partially reect those of their spouse or the need to support a larger family. Alternatively, it
may be the case that marriage directly leads to less tolerance of risk: there is evidence that
married males exhibit lower testosterone (e.g. Burnham, Chapman, Gray, McIntyre, Lipson,
and Ellison (2003)), while high testosterone levels (in both men and women) are often associ-
ated with risk-taking behaviors (e.g., Burnham (2007), Sapienza, Zingales, and Maestripieri
(2009)), and even appear to predict empire-building behavior among entrepreneurs (Guiso
and Rustichini (2011)). While this evidence is consistent with the idea that mating-induced
5
status concerns and the associated competitive risk-taking behavior are responses to evo-
lutionary pressures, it may not be directly linked to the marriage market competition in
the contemporary human society. Some of our previously discussed tests, based on the dis-
tinction between systematic and idiosyncratic volatility, can potentially distinguish between
these theories, but we cannot nd conclusive evidence favoring one over the other. We show
that marital status impacts behavior, but under the status concern interpretation this occurs
because marriage is a proxy for how much an individual cares about status, whereas under
the marriage-induces-change interpretation the eect of marriage is more direct.
One of the important questions in the literature that studies the impact of managerial
characteristics on rm outcomes is whether managers can alter their rms' policies to better
suit their personal objectives, or whether the observed dierences in the behavior of rms run
by dierent managers simply reect the matching of executives and rms along the relevant
(but dicult to observe for an econometrician) characteristics (e.g., more risk-tolerant CEOs
work for riskier rms). While we cannot completely rule out the latter mechanism as an
explanation for some of our results, we nd it reasonably unlikely, as marital status is not a
permanent characteristic of a CEO. Moreover, even if CEOs were always optimally matched
to rms, so that their preferences are fully in line with shareholder interests, our ndings
would still show that riskier rms prefer single CEOs, who are more willing to engage in risky
projects.
Apart from understanding manager and rm behavior as such, we are interested in shed-
ding light on the role of status concerns for wealthy individuals, who are likely to be marginal
investors in nancial markets. Status concerns have been proposed as explanations for gam-
bling behavior (Robson (1992)), local bias in portfolios (Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite
(2001) and DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2004)), and other forms of under-diversication,
such as entrepreneurial risk-taking (Roussanov (2010a)). Our ndings conrm the impor-
tance of such concerns by highlighting how they impact even high-stakes decisions. Models
of status dier in their predictions as to whether status considerations lead to greater tol-
erance for idiosyncratic or aggregate risk. In particular, models that feature \keeping up
with the Joneses," as in Abel (1990), exhibit conformist, or herding, behavior (e.g., Gollier
(2004), DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2004)). In contrast, the prediction that competition
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for status leads to greater idiosyncratic risk-taking (\getting ahead of the Joneses"), whether
resulting from marital sorting or not, is driven by the feature that the marginal benet of an
extra dollar of wealth is increasing in relative wealth (e.g., Gregory (1980), Becker, Murphy,
and Werning (2005)). Therefore, analyzing the dierences in attitudes towards idiosyncratic
risk by varying the strength of status concerns can shed light on which class of reduced-form
relative wealth preferences is empirically relevant, potentially yielding implications for asset
pricing and risk sharing.
There is a large literature in evolutionary psychology that links status, mating, and risk-
taking behavior, especially among males. Overwhelming evidence exists that wealth and
socioeconomic status are positively related to men's reproductive success.4 Both experimen-
tal and survey evidence indicate that mating concerns induce signaling of wealth through
conspicuous consumption and nancial risk-taking (e.g. see Griskevicius, Sundie, Miller, Ty-
bur, Cialdini, and Kenrick (2007)). This literature also documents greater risk-taking by
subjects confronted with situations suggestive of mating or competing for mates (Wilson and
Daly (2004) and Baker and Maner (2008)). In the economics literature, Barber and Odean
(2000) show that single men display more overcondent trading behavior then single women
(or married couples). Household survey data also appears to indicate that for males a change
in marital status from single to married is associated with a decrease in the portfolio share
invested in stocks and similar risky assets (Love (2010)).
Postlewaite (1998) advocates modeling status concerns as arising endogenously due to
non-market interactions (such as marriage and other settings where allocations depend on
matching) rather than being hard-wired into preferences. While we pursue the same modeling
approach here, one can also interpret our results as consistent with the view that both risk-
taking and marriage market behavior are determined biologically, and that the link between
the two is shaped by evolutionary forces. Evidence in the recent literature indicates that
status concerns stemming from marriage market competition are also important for other
dimensions of individual consumption and investment decisions. In particular, variation in
sex ratios, which determine the intensity of competition among males and females, appears to
4See Hopcroft (2006), Nettle and Pollet (2008), and Pollet and Nettle (2009), and extensive references
therein.
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induce variation in the propensity to invest in human and physical capital. Charles and Luoh
(2010) exploit the dierences in male incarceration rates in the U.S. to identify the eect of
marriage market competition on female schooling and labor supply, while Wei and Zhang
(2011a) and Wei and Zhang (2011b) use variation in gender imbalances (i.e., the relative
number of males to females in the population) across provinces of China to argue that they
result in higher savings, greater investment rates, and more economic growth, consistent with
the predictions of endogenous status models. Du and Wei (2010) and Du and Wei (2011)
use a quantitative model to show that the unbalanced sex ratios in China could also drive
its current account surpluses and real exchange rates. These papers focus on how marriage
market competition induces individuals to increase their future expected wealth due to the
fear of ending up in the lower end of the wealth distribution, and thus being at risk of failing
to obtain a suitable marital match. In contrast, our paper is more concerned with how
individuals, especially those already in the upper tail of the wealth distribution, attempt to
increase the probability of outperforming their peers by assuming more risk. Importantly,
such individuals may take on more idiosyncratic risk even if their expected wealth does not
increase as a result.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 develops a model of marriage market matching
and risk-taking; Section 2 describes our data; Section 3 presents our results using a direct
measure of marital status; Section 4 introduces an instrument for CEO marital status; and
Section 5 concludes.
1 Model
In this section we present a model of matching in the marriage market and investment in order
to highlight the interaction between matching-induced status concerns and risk-taking. The
model builds on Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992) and Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite
(2001), who show that competition for mates can induce a concern for relative position even
if it does not directly enter individuals' preferences. In our model, such relative wealth
concerns can lead to a greater tolerance for risk (e.g., Robson (1992), Becker, Murphy, and
Werning (2005)), and especially idiosyncratic risk, as emphasized by Roussanov (2010a).
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The intuition is that competition for mates is akin to an arms race: insofar as potential
spouses prefer wealthier suitors, what matters for attaining a spouse of a higher \quality" is
how much wealth one has relative to competitors (as long as the notion of spouse quality is
the same for everyone). If attaining a higher quality spouse raises one's marginal utility of
wealth, then the desire to \get ahead of the Joneses" overcomes risk aversion and leads to
greater risk-taking than if matching concerns were absent.
1.1 Environment
There is a continuum of agents of two types: setM (indexed by i) of males and set F (indexed
by j) of females, each of measure one.5 Each agent derives utility from a market good c and
a non-market good s:
u(c; s) = s log (1 + c)
Females are endowed with fj units of the non-market good, distributed according to c.d.f.
H on (0;1). At the beginning of the period, each male is endowed with W0 > 0 units of a
capital good. This good can be converted into the market good at the end of the period by
investing it in a combination of two linear technologies: riskless storage at rate Rf and agent-
specic risky investment that earns a stochastic rate of return Ri. The market \wealth" of
each male at the end of the period is then
W i = Wo
 
Rf + i(Ri  Rf ) ; (1)
where i is the share of initial wealth invested in the risky technology by (male) agent i,
subject to the constraint that W i > 0 (this constraint ensures that c > 0 and, consequently,
utility is always increasing in the non-market good). Risky returns Ri are distributed inde-
pendently and identically across agents with a c.d.f.  on A = [Rmin;1).6 Let the percentile
rank of male i in the resulting equilibrium distribution of end-of-period wealth be denoted
5We use these labels just for convenience. There is nothing in our model (or in our empirical tests) that
requires the two groups to have biological characteristics of their respective sexes.
6The assumption of independence is not critical; what is important is that the agent-specic investment
opportunities contain some purely idiosyncratic risk so that they are not perfectly correlated across managers.
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G (W i).7
A male and a female jointly consume each good, having matched; i.e., if a male i matches
with a female j, each of them receives utility u(W i; fj) at the end of the period. A sub-
set MM having total measure M 2 (0; 1) of males, and a set FM of the same measure of
females, drawn randomly and independently from their respective distributions, are perma-
nently matched at the beginning of the period. This is meant to capture the idea that people
may nd their marriage partners early in life, before their investment payos are realized.
Since all males are ex ante identical while the females are not, they are matched randomly.
The remaining subsets MU of males and FU of females enter the matching market at the end
of the period, after W i are realized. The relevant equilibrium concept is a stable matching,
as introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962), which requires that, given a matching, no male
and female would prefer to leave their current matches and pair with each other (see Roth
and Sotomayor (1990) for details). Since utility is increasing in both arguments for both
males and females, and the two goods are complements, the only stable matching is posi-
tively assortative (in W and f , respectively), so that the matched male i and female j have
the same percentile rank in the respective distributions:
G
 
W i

= H (fj) :
Therefore, the equilibrium allocations depend only on the relative status of the males after the
realization of uncertainty about the investment projects. The equilibrium matching function
produces a pairing
si = fj
such that
si = H 1
 
G
 
W i

= S
 
W i

.
Thus, at the beginning of the period, each unmatched male solves
max

E

S
 
W i

log
 
1 +W i

; (2)
7The assumption that only males have access to an investment technology is meant to simplify exposition.
One could instead consider a symmetric setting where both \males" and \females" face the same problem.
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where W i is subject to the resource constraint (1) above, and taking the equilibrium status
function S (W i) as given. Each exogenously matched male solves
max

E

si log
 
1 +W i

; (3)
subject to the same resource constraint (1), where si is the endowment of the female that
the male i was randomly matched with at the beginning of the period.
1.2 Equilibrium
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium: a solution i to the problem (2) such that i =  for
all i 2 MU . Since the decisions of matched males solving (3) are neither inuenced by nor
have an impact on the decisions of other males, they can be omitted from the description of
the equilibrium: there is an M such that 
i = M is satised trivially for all i 2MM .
In the symmetric equilibrium, the status matching given by the equilibrium distribution
of end-of-period wealth is a function of one's own choice i and the choice of all other agents
 (taken by agent i as given). In this symmetric equilibrium, the wealth distribution inherits
the properties of the probability distribution of risky asset returns, since
G (W ) = Pr

W i  W  =  W=Wo    1  Rf
!
.
Assume that the status function S (W i) is continuously dierentiable. Then the rst-order
condition for the individual investment problem faced by the unmarried male is
E

Rix

S (W i)
1 +W i
+ log
 
1 +W i

S 0
 
W i

= 0;
where Rix = Ri  Rf .
For those males whose marriage matches are assigned permanently at time 0, there is no
interaction between investment and matching concerns, and therefore si is orthogonal to W i.
Then the rst-order condition for the problem (3) of a married male is the standard Euler
equation:
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E
Rix
1 +W iM

= 0; (4)
whereW iM is the end-of-period value of the wealth portfolio optimally chosen by agent i 2MM
(married at the beginning of the period).
For the males who are active in the matching market at the end of the period, we can
write (1.2) as
0 = E

Rix

S (W i)
1 +W i

+ E

Rix log
 
1 +W i

S 0
 
W i

= Cov

Rix
1 +W i
; S
 
W i

+ E

Rix
1 +W i

E

S
 
W i

+Cov
 
Rix log
 
1 +W i

; S 0
 
W i

+ E

Rix log
 
1 +W i

E

S 0
 
W i

;
so that
E

Rix
1 +W i

=   1
E [S (W i)]
24 Cov  Rix1+W i ; S (W i)+ Cov (Rix log (1 +W i) ; S 0 (W i))
+E [Rix log (1 +W i)]E [S 0 (W i)]
35 .
(5)
Suppose the status function is linear:
si = S
 
W i

= W i; (6)
so that S 0 (W i) =  is a (positive) constant and Cov (Rix log (1 +W i) ; S 0 (W i)) = 0. Then
(5) implies
E

Rix
1 +W i

=   1
E [S (W i)]

Cov

Rix
1 +W i
; S
 
W i

+ E

Rix log
 
1 +W i

E

S 0
 
W i

.
Consequently, for single males this Euler equation implies an inequality
E

Rix
1 +W iU

< 0 (7)
that must satised by the optimal wealth portfolios W iU for all i 2 MU (unmarried at the
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beginning of period). By comparison with the Euler equation (4), this inequality states that
the expected excess return on the idiosyncratic risky project, risk-adjusted using the stochas-
tic discount factor of a married investor evaluated at the optimal wealth of a single investor,
is negative. That is, the single investor's optimal portfolio exhibits a higher allocation to the
idiosyncratic asset than that optimally chosen by the married agent. In other word, agents
who are active in the marriage market invest more in the idiosyncratic risky project than
those who are married at the beginning of period.
What is the mechanism behind this result? If the idiosyncratic project enjoys a high
return, this not only raises the wealth (and therefore consumption) of the agent, but also
increases the equilibrium quality of his match, since the wealth of other agents is unaected,
and so it is easier for him to beat the competition. Thus, S(W i) increases, which in turn
raises the marginal utility of consumption. Since wealth becomes relatively more valuable in
the high Ri state, this idiosyncratic asset is less risky from the perspective of an agent who
is active in the marriage market than it is from the perspective of an exogenously-matched
agent, who does not care about relative position. If the risky asset realization was common
to all agents, however, this eect would not arise. Since all males are ex ante identical, a
higher return on the common asset does not alter their relative positions and hence has no
impact on status and, consequently, match quality.
1.3 Special cases and extensions
The model prediction above was derived under the simplifying assumption (6), which states
that the reduced form equilibrium status/matching function is linear in male agent's wealth.
Under what conditions is the status function linear? The following simple examples provide
sucient conditions:
1. female good is distributed uniformly on [fmin; fmax] and the equilibrium distribution of
wealth is uniform (which is the case if Rix is uniformly distributed on [Rmin; Rmax]);
2. the distribution of the female non-market good coincides with the equilibrium distri-
bution of male wealth, H (x) = G (x) for all x; this situation is relevant also if the
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problem is completely symmetric, i.e. the females face an investment problem identical
to that faced by the males.
What if S is not linear? Then the sign of Cov (Rix log (1 +W i) ; G0 (W i)) is ambiguous
and depends on the shape of the status/matching function S, which, in turn, depends on the
equilibrium distribution of wealth G. In particular, if S is convex, the latter covariance is
negative and the same conclusion as above holds. However, if S is concave, the conclusion is
ambiguous and potentially depends on the specic parameterization of the model.
The feature of the model that yields the prediction of greater risk-taking by single man-
agers under a broad set of conditions is the complementarity between the male and the female
good (i.e., the fact that ucs > 0). This feature is intuitive: a higher quality spouse raises
one's own marginal utility of consumption. For example, a spouse with a higher level of
\sophistication" may inuence one's tastes in a direction that demands purchase of more
expensive consumption goods.
The complementarity assumption is not crucial. For example, Cole, Mailath, and Postle-
waite (2001) consider a setting in which utility is separable in the market and non-market
good, and show that if the status/matching payo is convex in market wealth, the same
result as here obtains (agents take more idiosyncratic risk than in the absence of matching).
However, if utility is suciently concave over the non-market good, the opposite prediction
obtains - the agents \herd" towards common projects (Roussanov (2010b) describes in detail
the conditions under which these predictions hold).
A model can be easily generalized to accommodate other margins that have an eect on
wealth accumulation, such as a choice of eort vs. leisure or intertemporal consumption-
saving decisions. Since the status payo that comes from the marriage market competition
provides an additional benet of wealth, the key prediction of the model carries over under
fairly general conditions: unmarried individuals invest more than married ones. This is
because the relative position concerns induced by matching are a form of an arms race:
single individuals competing for mates are lead to accumulate more resources than they
would for consumption purposes alone. However, unlike other models of relative wealth
concerns based on marriage market interactions, such as Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite
(1992) and Wei and Zhang (2011a), our emphasis is not on pure wealth accumulation, but
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rather on the risk-taking that leads to extreme outcomes and increased wealth dispersion.
While CEOs do not necessarily compete with one another for mates, they do not compete
with an average person. Rather, they likely compete with other wealthy and highly visible
individuals, such as top entrepreneurs, entertainers, and asset managers, who dominate the
highest wealth percentiles (Kaplan and Rauh (2010)). Indeed, our model emphasizes that
that the payo to the relative position is the highest in the right tail of the distribution (due
to the complementarity between wealth and spouse quality), leading to increased risk-taking.
1.4 Discussion of Implications
We show that under a set of plausible conditions individuals who expect to compete in the
market for mates exhibit greater risk-taking than those who do not, including those who are
already matched. We aim to test this prediction of the model by analyzing dierences in
risk-taking between single and married managers. The intuition is that for single individu-
als marriage market competition is more acute than for those already married (even if the
matches are not expected to be permanent, as long as divorce and re-matching are costly).
The model is deliberately simple in that it compares people who make investment deci-
sions before competing in the marriage market to those who invest after being exogenously
matched. The way to interpret this assumption is that the probability of being married at a
given point in time depends on luck (e.g., in meeting a suitable partner) as well as relative
wealth.
2 Data
2.1 CEO Characteristics
We collect the names, biographical information, and compensation of all CEOs covered by
ExecuComp in the 1993-2008 period. We then research their marital and family status using
a variety of public sources, such as the Marquis Who's Is Who in Finance and Industry,
the SEC insider lings, and various media mentions. The ultimate goal of this eort is to
establish whether a particular CEO was married or single during his tenure. Unfortunately,
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we can obtain the actual marriage dates only for a small minority of CEOs, which means
that for the bulk of our sample we have to rely on an indirect approach. More specically, for
those CEOs for whom we can nd no dates, we start with the assumption that they are single,
and then change their status if we nd information indicating the opposite.8 Any CEO who
is ever mentioned as being married but the exact dates of marriage are not available is coded
as married throughout his or her tenure. This means that some CEOs who were divorced or
whose spouses were deceased will be wrongly counted as married. However, there also exists
an osetting bias. Since we require evidence to classify a CEO as married, those CEOs who
are not prominent enough to warrant mention in our sources (or those who are very private
with regards to their personal information) will appear in the data as single even if they are
actually married. While we perform a comprehensive search for all CEOs, it is inevitable
that we miss some. Furthermore, some CEOs may be involved in marriage-like relationships
but not formally married, and their status for our purposes should be classied as married
but will not be.
The net eect of these biases cannot be determined with much certainty, but we are
hopeful our data is not too unrepresentative. Table 1 shows that in terms of CEO-year
observations married CEOs account for 84% of our sample. If we just consider each individual
CEO, single ones make up 20% of our sample. According to the U.S. Census data, 70% of
men in the 35-59 age range were married in 2000. This group represents most of the CEOs in
our sample, so it would appear that we overestimate the number of currently married CEOs.9
But CEOs are also much wealthier than typical Americans, and wealth may be positively
correlated with the probability of being married.
In order to conrm that the proportion of single CEOs in our data is reasonable, we use
data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for the year 2001, which is roughly in
the middle of our sample period. The SCF oversamples wealthy households, and therefore is
more likely than the Census to accurately capture the demographic to which the CEOs in our
8Our information sources report that a CEO is married reasonably frequently, but almost never directly
report that one is single, so that we cannot start with the assumption that a CEO is married unless we nd
evidence to the contrary.
9At the same time, we may be underestimating the proportion of CEOs who were married at any point
in time (though not necessarily during their tenure). In the Census data, of the men falling in the 1950-1954
birth cohort, 89% had been married at some point before reaching the age of 50.
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sample belong. It also does not apply systematic top-coding to income and wealth variables,
unlike most other commonly used survey datasets, and therefore provides reliable evidence
on the nancial position of the wealthiest households (see Kennickell and Lane (2006)).10 We
estimate a logistic regression predicting that the head of household in the SCF is single using
the following specication:
Pr (Single) = 

 +  Wealth+   Income+   Age+   Age
2
100

; (8)
where Single is a dummy variable that equals one if the head is unmarried, Age is the head's
age, Income is the annual household income, and Wealth is a measure of household wealth.
We use two wealth measures: one is the total household net worth (total assets minus total
liabilities), and the other is the value of holdings concentrated in the single largest risky asset.
The latter wealth variable (see Roussanov (2010b) for details on its construction) is meant
to mimic our proxy for CEO wealth, which is based on holdings of own-company stock and
options. We do not use SCF population weights, which are supposed to address the issue of
oversampling of wealthy households, as we are interested in capturing the relation precisely
for such households rather than the U.S. population as a whole.
Table 2 presents the regression results, together with the implied probability of being
single computed for the median CEO in our sample. This probability is calculated based on
the median CEO wealth of $13:8 million, median annual CEO compensation of $2:2 million,
and median CEO age of 55 years. The implied probabilities for various specications fall in
the 11 to 20% range, which is not too far from the proportion of CEOs we classify as single
in our sample. Consequently, we conclude that our measure of marital status is reasonably
accurate, at least in the sense that we do not greatly overestimate or underestimate the
number of unmarried CEOs.
While there is a number of CEOs who are divorced in our sample, we do not explicitly
consider divorced CEOs `single', as it is not obvious from the perspective of our model that
we should. Divorce is not an exogenous shock that simply changes an individual's marital
10The SCF does explicitly drop all households/individuals listed in the Forbes 400 list of the wealthiest
people. Since this list covers only a subset of the CEOs in our sample, the overlap between the two groups
is likely suciently large to make reliable inferences.
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status. It is actually a result of a decision by one (or both) spouses that takes into account the
value of re-entering the marriage market. In particular, the CEO's decision prior to divorce
may take into account the matching considerations arising from a potential re-marriage. For
example, if a CEO's wealth has increased enough since marriage, the prospect of improving
the marital match may increase risk-taking prior (and potentially leading) to divorce. On
the other hand, even if divorce is costly, if a CEO's wealth falls enough, the spouse may
prefer to terminate the marriage and seek a better match in the re-marriage market, which
will reduce the CEO's risk tolerance after marrying.
If we wrongly characterized marital status of some CEOs, this would not constitute a
problem for our analysis, as long as this eect was uncorrelated with anything else. The
problem is that this may not be true for CEOs who are married, with no public information
documenting their status. Such CEOs are likely to be less prominent than their peers and
could potentially be associated with younger, riskier rms. This eect may explain risk-taking
attitudes of managers we classify as `single', without any actual eect of marital status. For
example, Malmendier and Tate (2009) nd that \superstar" CEOs exhibit dierent behaviors
than their less prominent counterparts. This may represent a serious problem for our analysis,
which we address in several ways.11
First, in our regressions we use as controls observable measures that are likely to be
correlated with both the degree of prominence of a company and its riskiness, such as rm
size, market-to-book ratio, and age. Second, we explicitly control for the eect of prominence
on our classication of CEOs as married or single by constructing measures of frequency of
CEO and company media mentions. Specically, we use Factiva Dow Jones database to
count the number of news stories mentioning the CEO and/or the company associated with
each of the observations during our sample period. We use these measures to control for the
eect of prominence on risk-taking in our analysis. While these controls do appear to capture
some variation in rm risk, their inclusion does not aect our results.
11Such \superstar status" itself could be viewed as a type of status payo that could induce risk-taking.
Shemesh (2010) presents some evidence that achieving this status leads CEOs to reduce subsequent risk-
taking.
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2.2 Other Control Variables
We augment our CEO data set with data from COMPUSTAT and CRSP, which we use to
construct measures of corporate risk-taking and the necessary control variables. The various
variables we use are dened below (all numbers except ratios are in millions).12
Total investment (Investment) is capital expenditures (CapEx) plus acquisitions minus
asset sales (Net Acquisitions) plus R&D expenditure (R&D) plus advertising expenditure
(Advert:), scaled by net property, plant & equipment (PP&E). This is a more comprehensive
measure than used in most of the literature, but we believe R&D and advertising expenditures
should be counted as investment for our purposes, as they do reect a rm's risk-taking
(Guay (1999) uses R&D expenditure as a proxy for CEO risk-taking). We also consider
the individual components of investment separately (scaled by PP&E). Total volatility is
computed as the annualized volatility of a rm's monthly stock returns over the previous
year. Idiosyncratic volatility is calculated as the annual volatility of the residuals of the
rm's stock returns regressed on the CRSP value-weighted stock market portfolio return.
Firm size (logA) is the log of its total assets. Book equity (BE) equals stockholders'
equity; if that item is missing in COMPUSTAT, then it is common equity plus preferred
equity; and if those items are unavailable as well, then it is total assets minus total liabilities.
Market-to-book ratio (M=B) is the ratio of the market value of assets relative to their book
value, where the market value of assets is the total value of assets minus book value of equity
plus market value of equity. Cash ow (CF ) equals earnings before extraordinary items plus
depreciation & amortization, scaled by net PP&E. Book leverage (Leverage) equals the
sum of long-term and current debt divided by the sum of long-term debt, current debt, and
book equity. Firm age is computed with respect to the rst year it appears in COMPUSTAT.
All rm-related variables (except size and book equity) are winsorized at the 1% and 99%
levels.
We also use information available in ExecuComp on the relevant characteristics of man-
agers. CEO wealth (logwealth) is the log of CEO's total holdings of own company stock and
options, which we use as a proxy for total CEO wealth. Age and Tenure are the CEO's age
12We include in our sample all rms for which we have the necessary data. Our results continue to hold if
we exclude nancial rms.
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and his tenure with the rm, as of the current year. The Factiva-based measures of CEO
and rm prominence are each dened as the logarithm of the total number of their media
mentions during our sample period. For CEOs, we only count news stories that are explicitly
related to the rm they run, in order to avoid greatly exaggerating the prominence of CEOs
with common names.
3 CEO Marital Status and Risk-Taking
3.1 Overview
Table 1 presents the main summary statistics for our data, grouping rms based on the
marital status of their CEOs. It conrms that our classication produces intuitive results:
married CEOs are on average somewhat older and, consistent with the theory that relates
marital market competition with wealth, richer (insofar as we can proxy their wealth with the
value of their holdings of the company's stock and options). This rst look at the data also
supports our main hypothesis: rms managed by CEOs whom we classify as single display
markedly dierent characteristics. Such rms have higher investment and experience greater
return volatility, both of which measures should be related to the amount of risk associated
with a rm. The dierences are highly signicant, both economically and statistically. Return
volatility of single CEO rms is 24% higher, and a t-test for the dierence produces a t-
statistic of about 14 (untabulated). Investment is 69% higher for such rms relative to those
run by married CEOs, with a t-statistic of 13 for the dierence.
These dierences appear to be quite dramatic, but single CEO-run rms are also on
average smaller, younger, and potentially faster-growing, as indicated by their higher market-
to-book ratios. Since both small and growth rms tend to invest more and have more volatile
returns, it is important to control for these characteristics. We therefore run a variety of
regression specications with investment and return volatility as independent variables:
RiskTaking =  +   Single+  X +   Y +   (Single ~Y ); (9)
where RiskTaking is our measure of risk-taking, Single is a dummy variable equaling one if
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the CEO is unmarried and zero otherwise, X is a set of rm characteristics, and Y is a set of
CEO characteristics (the specic variable denitions are given above), and ~Y are the same
characteristics that have been demeaned. All our regressions also include industry (based on
the Fama-French 49-industry classication) and year xed eects. We compute t-statistics
using clustered standard errors (by rm).
3.2 Single CEOs Run Riskier Firms: Examining Return Volatility
Tables 3 and 4 present regression results for the total (annualized) volatility of rm stock
returns and for the idiosyncratic component of volatility, respectively. The coecient of most
interest is the dummy variable Single.
Do rms led by single CEOs experience greater return volatility, controlling for rm
characteristics? Results reported in Table 3 show that rms run by single CEOs do exhibit
more volatile returns. This dierence is statistically signicant (t-stat=2.3 in columns 4
and 5, which feature the most comprehensive sets of control variables) and economically
meaningful, with the coecient magnitude suggesting about a 3% dierence.13 In column
1, we control for various rm characteristics that may be related to stock return volatility.
Importantly, all these rm-level control variables have the expected eect: rms with low
cash ows, rms with high market-to-book ratios, small rms, rms with high leverage, and
young rms have more volatile stock returns.
Since married and single CEOs also have dierent personal characteristics, in column 2
we add controls for CEO characteristics, such as age and tenure, and the interactions between
those characteristics and the single status dummy variable (characteristics variables in the
interaction terms are always demeaned). Both age and tenure are signicantly negatively
related to rm risk. Older CEOs tend to be more conservative, which is also consistent with
the relevance of positional concerns declining with age, since the value of marriage is likely
to decline if there are fewer years over which one can enjoy its benets.14 Furthermore,
people who remain single at an older age are more likely to be those who do not value the
13Computed as 0.012 (Single coecient magnitude) divided by 0.370 (mean return volatility for rms run
by married CEOs).
14Levi, Li, and Zhang (2010) document more aggressive deal-making behavior among younger CEOs, and
argue that it is driven by their higher testosterone levels.
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benets of marriage highly, and therefore for whom matching concerns are less relevant. Such
considerations imply that we need to control for these CEO characteristics, as they are also
correlated with the probability of being married. For example, older CEOs may invest more
cautiously and are more likely to be married, which would confound the eect of marital
status if appropriate controls are not included.
Introducing manager age and tenure in column 2 reduces the coecient on Single from
0:012 to 0:008 and the t-statistic from 2:64 to 1:76 relative to the specication in column 1,
which only includes rm-level controls. This is due to the fact that both CEO age and CEO
tenure have a negative eect on volatility.
In column 3, we add our controls for CEO and rm prominence. The coecient on CEO
prominence is large and signicant (t-stat=3.12), which is consistent with previous work
(e.g., Malmendier and Tate (2009)). Our main nding that single CEOs invest more remains
unaltered. In fact, it turns out that the eect of prominence, if anything, works against us,
since it is the CEOs of riskier rms who appear to have higher rates of media mentions,
and are therefore less likely to be mistakenly classied as single. Consequently, the Single
coecient actually becomes larger, with a higher statistical signicance (t-statistics are above
2 in all of the specications where this control variable is included).
Our model predicts that the relative wealth concerns induced by marriage market compe-
tition make single managers less averse to idiosyncratic risk, since common shocks that aect
everyone equally do not change relative ranking. Indeed, our empirical ndings hold { and
are actually stronger { for idiosyncratic volatility, consistent with the model's predictions.
These ndings are presented in Table 4. In fact, all of the eect of marital status on volatil-
ity is driven by idiosyncratic volatility.15 Alternative mechanisms generating dierences in
risk aversion between single and married CEOs, such as life-cycle changes in consumption
commitments and preference aggregation within a family, are unlikely to drive our ndings,
unless managers are able to perfectly hedge all of the aggregate risk exposure inherent in
their compensation.
In columns 4 and 5 of Tables 3 and 4, we add as a control institutional holdings of company
15Unreported regression results for total volatility controlling for its idiosyncratic component are available
upon request.
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stock, obtained from Thomson Reuters database of 13f lings. We use institutional holdings
as a proxy for the quality of a rm's corporate governance, under the assumption that rms
with higher institutional ownership will be more responsive to shareholders. We introduce
this variable to test whether greater shareholder control attenuates the eect of marital
status, perhaps by making it harder for single CEOs to undertake overly risky investments.
Firms with greater institutional ownership are indeed less risky (the coecient is negative and
statistically signicant). Moreover, the interaction with the Single variable is negative and
statistically signicant, indicating that better governed rms may moderate the tendency of
single managers to increase risk. This eect is particularly strong for idiosyncratic volatility,
albeit it is slightly weaker in specications listed in column 5 of each table that features
joint industry  year xed eects (rather than the separate industry and year xed eects
employed elsewhere).
Controlling for rm characteristics helps isolate the potential eect of manager's pref-
erences on rm performance, but it understates the explanatory power of our model with
respect to the managers' individual behavior. In particular, insofar as potential managers
choose to work for rms that match their risk preferences, single managers are likely to choose
to work for companies exhibiting greater exposure to (idiosyncratic) risk than married man-
agers. When we exclude controls for rm characteristics (column 6), the results become much
stronger: return volatility of rms run by single CEOs is 16% higher, and the t-statistic for
the dierence is 7.83. This is not surprising from the perspective of our model, as single CEOs
are more likely to be matched with riskier rms if they are less averse to (idiosyncratic) risk.
But they also undertake more risks even when we control for this tendency (as results in
columns 1-5 show).
3.3 Where Does Risk Come From: Evidence on Firm Investment
What drives dierences in riskiness between rms run by single and married CEOs? Our
hypothesis implies that besides opting to work for inherently riskier rms, single CEOs may
steer their companies towards projects with greater idiosyncratic risk, as well as generally
pursue more aggressive investment policies. In order to test this prediction we examine the
eect of marital status on investment. Tables 5, 6, and 7 present regression results for vari-
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ous forms of rm investment (total investment, net acquisitions, and R&D plus advertising
expenditure, respectively).
Column 1 of Table 5 shows that the Single coecient is positive and statistically signi-
cant (t-stat=2.35). Its magnitude suggests an economically very meaningful eect of marital
status: single CEOs invest 0.09 more than their married counterparts (relative to the sample
mean of 1.00). In this specication, we control just for dierent rm characteristics that are
known to be correlated with investment. The coecients on these controls are all the same
as documented in previous work. Firms with high cash ows, growth rms, small rms, and
rms with high past investment tend to invest more.16 These are well-known correlations,
and the fact they hold in our sample reassures us that it similar to those used in other studies.
The inclusion of CEO age and tenure reduces the Single coecient somewhat, but it
remains statistically signicant (t-stat=1.71). And its magnitude still indicates a large eect:
a rm with a single 45-year old CEO with a tenure of ve years will have investment that
is on average 0.26 higher than that of the same rm with a married CEO, while the sample
mean for rms with married CEOs is 0.90. In other words, investment of such rms is 29%
higher, which is a very substantial economic dierence.
Interestingly, the interaction coecient between Single and Age is negative, which means
that the impact of marital status on investment is less important for older CEOs. This is
consistent with the basic motivation underlying our study. If single CEOs indeed choose to
invest more because they are less risk-averse due to their competing in the marriage market,
we would expect this tendency to be less pronounced for older CEOs, as presumably the
benets of a prospective future marriage are lower later in one's life. Further, given some
underlying heterogeneity in the individual desire to get married, as more people are likely
to be married in older age groups, those who remain single are likely to be those who are
less interested in marriage and therefore for whom the matching-induced status motive is
inoperative.
Moreover, this negative interaction between the eects of age and marital status also sug-
gests that the driving force behind our results may not be purely a selection eect, whereby
16Our results do not change if we use investment during the previous CEO's tenure as a control instead of
lagged investment.
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CEOs who prefer to stay single are fundamentally dierent (e.g., in terms of their risk atti-
tudes) from those who marry. If that were the case, then the eect of marital status would
be less likely to decrease with age. In fact, it would likely increase, as at older ages the single
group would be predominantly populated by people with particularly strong \aversion" to
marriage.
Our results do not change if we add controls for rm region, or if we use a dierent industry
classication scheme.17 They also are stronger if we focus just on R&D and advertising
expenditures (Table 7), which arguably capture rm risk-taking more accurately, as they are
commonly perceived as representing especially risky activities. The results are somewhat
weaker for Net Acquisitions (Table 6), likely due to the fact that a lot of smaller rms do not
make any acquisitions, but even there the eect is statistically signicant in a specication
with the most comprehensive set of controls (including industry  year xed eects) in
column 5.
Does institutional ownership mitigate the aggressive investment policy of single CEOs?
The institutional holdings coecient is positive and signicant for total investment and
acquisitions (and essentially zero for R&D and advertising). However, the coecient on
the interaction term between holdings and Single is not signicant, and our ndings on the
eect of Single on investment remain the same as before once these controls are included,
(and are even boosted by the inclusion of industry  year xed eects in column 5).
As mentioned before, we are not taking a stand in this paper on whether CEOs alter rm
decisions to meet their own objectives or are just matched to rms along all their relevant
characteristics. In order to explore how much of a role CEO-rm matching plays, in the
last column we omit any rm characteristics from our regressions. Consequently, we are
comparing single and married CEOs just controlling for their personal characteristics. Under
that specication, the Single coecient for Total Investment grows dramatically to 0.45 (from
0.09), with a t-statistic of 5.23, and even the coecient for Net Acquisitions is statistically
signicant with a t-statistic of 2.59 (Table 6). Similarly to the return volatility results in
the previous section, these ndings suggest that riskier rms are strongly associated with
single CEOs, perhaps because these CEOs are more willing to accept risks. However, even
17Those results are available upon request.
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if we control for this selection eect (in columns 1-5), single CEOs still assume greater risks
than married ones. Results in column 5 are probably the most conservative estimate of the
dierence between married and single CEOs, to the extent that our (potentially imperfect)
controls capture all of the relevant rm characteristics, whereas those in column 6 represent
the most aggressive estimate.
It is not surprising that rms that invest more are also riskier. Unfortunately, we do not
have enough observations of CEO marital status changes (or changes between married and
single CEOs) to establish whether rm risk and investment also change when they occur.
However, we can exploit the impact of within-rm variation in risk on investment to explore
futher the role of CEO marital status. Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012) nd that an increase
in idiosyncratic volatility decreases corporate investment, which is consistent with the eect
of managerial risk aversion, since CEOs cannot hedge purely idiosyncratic (rm-specic)
risk. Our model predicts that single CEOs have higher tolerance for idiosyncratic risk. As a
consequence, we should expect to see a much weaker eect of lagged idiosyncratic volatility
of the rm's stock returns on investment among rms whose heads are single. To test this
hypothesis, we estimate the following regression specication:
Investmentt =  +   Single+   IdV olt 1 +   (Single ~IdV olt 1) +  X; (10)
where IdV olt 1 is lagged idiosyncratic volatility of the rm's stock returns and X is a set of
rm and CEO characteristics used as controls. Importantly, the latter includes rm as well
as year xed eects, as we are interested in within-rm eect of risk on investment. Results
are reported in Table 8. Consistent with the evidence in Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012),
we document a robustly negative and statistically signicant eect of IdV olt 1 on total rm
investment, with coecients of -0.175 without any controls other than xed eects and around
-0.330 when various combinations of controls are added, and t-statistics ranging between -3
and -6. Furthermore, while there is no statistically signicant eect of Single itself on within-
rm variation in investment, there is a strongly positive eect of the interaction between
Single and the idiosyncratic volatility measure on investment. This eect is essentially of
the same magnitude as the eect of volatility itself, with coecients ranging between 0.216
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and 0.319 and t-statistics between 2.2 and 3.3. Therefore, for rms run by single CEOs, the
total eect of these coecients is eectively zero, implying that single managers are much
less aected by changes in idiosyncratic risk than married ones, which is consistent with the
predictions of our model. While married CEOs strongly decrease investment in response to
increases in idiosyncratic volatility, single ones do not alter their investment patterns. As in
our previous tests, single managers are much less averse to idiosyncratic risk.
3.4 Discussion
Our results support the hypothesis that single CEOs assume more idiosyncratic risk than
married ones. This is consistent with our model of CEO status-seeking that is motivated by
the desire to nd a suitable marriage partner and the resulting competition in the marriage
market.
Of course, it is possible that single managers exhibit dierent risk-taking behavior from
married managers even absent status concerns. People who are single at a given age may
be inherently more risk-tolerant than those who are married by the same age. It would
be possible to distinguish this scenario from our theory by exploiting changes in managers'
marital status over time. Unfortunately, this would require a signicant number of CEOs
to experience marital status changes during their tenure, and for us to be able to document
such a transition. Moreover, we would need to have precise dates of these marital transitions,
which are dicult to obtain.18 Thus, we cannot convincingly distinguish our hypothesis from
the alternative one that single and married CEOs are simply dierent using within-manager
variation. Instead, in order to rule out the hypothesis of innate heterogeneity, we employ an
instrumental variables approach described in the following section.
Another possibility is that marriage changes the utility of wealth by introducing spousal
preferences into the CEO's objective function. For example, a CEO who has to support
a spouse and children may have a higher required level of consumption expenditure and
therefore income. This would make married CEOs eectively more risk-averse than single
ones for reasons that have nothing to do with status. However, it seems likely that most, if
18We are able to nd 76 CEOs in our sample who became married during their tenure, but for many of
those the marital status change occurred right after they became CEO or shortly before them stepping down
(thus not allowing a proper comparison of managerial decisions before and after marriage).
27
not all, CEOs are wealthy enough for such concerns to be of second-order importance. At
the same time, the impact of status concerns should be particularly pronounced in the upper
tail of the wealth distribution.
It is also worth pointing out that both the innate heterogeneity and intra-family prefer-
ence aggregation theories, at least in their simplest forms, do not predict that single CEOs
will assume more idiosyncratic (rather than systematic) risk. In contrast, status concerns
imply that it is exactly idiosyncratic risk that is of interest to single CEOs, as it aects the
probability of outperforming their peers. In unreported results, we nd evidence of portfo-
lio under-diversication at the household level using the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances,
where single individuals have a greater share of their wealth invested in an average individual
stock than married couples, while there is less evidence of great risk taking as such. This
result also suggests that the eect of marital status on risk attitudes is not simply driven by
pure dierences in risk aversion, either inherent or induced by life-cycle considerations (such
as consumption commitments), and is more likely to be driven by relative wealth concerns
due to competition in the marriage market.
4 Instrumental Variables Approach: Divorce Costs
4.1 Community Property vs. Equitable Division
While some of the variation in CEOs' marital status is likely driven by their luck in nding
a suitable marriage partner, some variation is likely due to the perceived costs of getting
married. In particular, a nontrivial fraction of marriages, including those of CEOs, end
in divorce. Since divorce is costly, this possibility should have an eect on an individual's
propensity to enter into a marriage in the rst place. For a wealthy person, a major concern
is the division of property upon dissolution of a marriage. In the U.S., the division of marital
assets upon divorce is regulated at the state level. Consequently, we can exploit the variation
in the divorce laws across states of CEOs' residences, as it is plausibly exogenous both to the
match between a rm and a CEO and to the rms' investment policies.
The most salient aspect of heterogeneity in the laws guiding the division of marital prop-
erty is the distinction between community property and equitable division. The former man-
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dates equal division of all assets acquired during marriage between the two spouses upon
divorce, whereas the latter follows the common law practice allowing the division to be de-
termined by a judge based on a range of factors, including the relative contributions of the
spouses. It is commonly understood that community property is more advantageous for
the poorer spouse (see Voena (2011)). Since CEOs are typically substantially wealthier than
their spouses, equal division of assets mandated by community property laws makes marriage
costlier for them (insofar as there is a positive probability of its dissolution).
There are nine states in the U.S. that have adopted the community property system:
Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wis-
consin.19 While community property legislation was adopted by these states at dierent
points in time, it was in place in all of them throughout the period covered by our sample.
Thus, there is little concern that political economy considerations could create an endogeneity
problem, since it is highly unlikely that the passage of laws regulating divorce is systemat-
ically related to rms' investment opportunities and risk decades later. It is interesting to
note that the use of the community property standard is not obviously related to (current)
state characteristics. It is present in both rich and poor states, in large and small ones, as
well as those whose populations' political preferences tend to be either predominantly liberal
or predominantly conservative.
Although we do not directly observe the state of CEO residence, we can use the state in
which the rm is headquartered as a reasonably good proxy for which type of jurisdiction is
more relevant for the CEO.20 While the number of community property jurisdictions is small,
it includes some of the most populous states in the U.S., and thus represents approximately
36% of our sample of CEOs.
A potential issue is that prospective CEOs who are married may choose to reside in certain
states because their divorce laws are more friendly to wealthy individuals. The market for
CEOs in states where divorce is more costly would then have a relatively greater supply
of potential CEOs who are single. If these CEOs are also more innately risk-tolerant on
19Puerto Rico is also a community property jurisdiction.
20Although a number of CEOs of companies headquartered in New York City reside in Connecticut or New
Jersey, both of these are also equitable distribution states, and so there is no error due to misclassication
for these CEOs.
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average, this could represent a problem for our instrument. However, given that the labor
market for CEOs of public companies is likely nation-wide, this would require divorce laws
to be a signicant factor in determining where potential CEOs seek employment, which we
believe is not plausible. What our instrument relies on is the assumption that a state's legal
regime can inuence a single CEO's decision whether to get married at a given point in time.
More specically, a CEO who is currently single and resides in a community property state
is more likely to postpone marriage, holding all else equal.
Prenuptial agreements may limit the extent to which community property statutes im-
pose a cost on wealthy individuals who marry less wealthy spouses. However, even among
the wealthy their adoption is by no means universal. Moreover, enforcement of premarital
agreement by the courts may not have been uniform over our sample period.21 To the extent
that such agreements decrease the impact of state laws on the cost of divorce, and therefore
on the probability of a single CEO getting married, this would only attenuate our rst-stage
estimates of the eect of community property states on CEO marital status, and consequently
weaken the statistical power of the instrument in the second stage. Mismeasurement of the
relevant jurisdiction would have a similar eect, weakening our results.
As a way of validating our instrumental variable approach externally to address some of
these concerns, we analyze data from the entire U.S. population collected by the U.S. Census
Bureau. The idea behind our instrument is that wealthier individuals are deterred from mar-
riage (i.e., are more likely to be single, ceteris paribus), if they reside in a community property
state. Thus, we test whether an additional interaction between measures of wealth/income
and community property residence is positive, using the data from the 2000 U.S. Census 5%
sample from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). Census does not collect
data on wealth, therefore we can only use data on personal income of the head of household.
Since current income is a noisy measure of lifetime income, especially for younger people, we
also use data on occupation of the head of household in order to identify individuals who
are likely to accumulate substantial wealth over time. In particular, we identify individuals
with occupation codes \Lawyers" and \Surgeons and physicians." Finally, as an additional
21A recent example of a prenuptial agreement not upheld by the legal system in a community prop-
erty jurisdiction is the high-prole divorce between Frank and Jamie McCourt (http://www.avvo.com/legal-
guides/ugc/judge-tosses-out-prenup-dodgers-ownership-still-undecided).
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measure that is closest to our focus on corporate CEOs, we separately identify individuals
with occupation code \Chief executives."22 We use two measures of single marital status: a
narrow measure that includes only people reporting to have never been married, and a broad
measure that includes those who never married as well as those who report their current mar-
ital status as either divorced or widowed. All of the regressions controlling for a quadratic in
age to capture life-cycle eects.
Table 9 presents the results of these tests. The general regression specication is
Single = +Comm+Income+Age+Age
2
100
+Occ+ gIncomeComm+gOccComm;
(11)
where Comm is the dummy variable equal to one if the household's state of residence is a
community property state. Single is a dummy variable equal to one if the head of household
has never been married (specication 1) or has never been married, is divorced, or is widowed
(specications 2-4). Income is in millions. Occ is a dummy variable for whether the head of
household is either a lawyer or a surgeon/physician by occupation (specication 3) or a chief
executive (specication 4). The interacted variables gIncome and gOcc are demeaned using
population weights. Consistent with our results using SCF data in Table 2, higher income
individuals are less likely to be single, as are older individuals (albeit the eect of age is
nonlinear).
In accordance with our hypothesis that higher-income individuals are less likely to be mar-
ried if they reside in a community property jurisdiction, the interaction of income with the
community property dummy is positive and highly statistically signicant (with t-statistics
around 10), regardless of which denition of single status is used. This occurs despite the
fact that the eect of community property itself is actually negative (and signicant, with
t-statistics between 4 and 6). The eect of the community property regime on marriage rates
in the general population can depend on a number of factors, such as the dierence in income
distribution or religious composition between the equitable distribution and community prop-
erty states. However, this does not have an eect on the validity of our instrument. What
matters is whether community property standard has a dierential impact on the decisions
22This category is likely to include CEOs of privately held rms as well as, potentially, heads of nonprot
organizations. The number of public-company CEOs in this sample is likely to be small, given the small
number of publicly listed companies relative to the total number of rms in the U.S.
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of wealthy individuals, and whether it makes it less likely for such individuals to get married.
Similarly to the results above, the interaction of a dummy for high-income occupations
(doctors and lawyers) with the community property dummy is also positive and statistically
signicant (specication 3). The interaction of a CEO dummy with the community property
dummy is also positive but not quite statistically signicant, likely due to the fact that
many individuals reporting \Chief executive" as their occupation are not actually suciently
wealthy to be concerned about property division in divorce. We conclude that the eect of
residing in a community property state on marital status is concentrated among the wealthier
individuals, which validates the use of community property jurisdiction as a useful instrument
for CEO single status, as well as alleviates concerns that this variable might be exclusively
capturing unobserved heterogeneity across states.
The fact that residing in a community property state reduces the incentive for a wealthy
person to get married by increasing the cost of potential divorce in no way suggests that the
marriage market competition motive becomes inoperative. It merely implies that, holding all
else equal, such a person will wait for a higher-quality match compared to a person residing
in an equitable distribution jurisdiction. Therefore, at a given age and level of wealth, a
community-property CEO is more likely to be single and, consequently, more willing to take
on idiosyncratic risk in the hope of achieving high status.
4.2 Instrumental Variable Results
In the rst stage, we regress the (potentially) endogenous variable Single on the instrumental
variable, Community, which equals one if the rm is headquartered in one of the community
property states and zero otherwise, as well as all of the control variables that we use. Our
specication is as follows:
Single =  +   Community +  X +   Y; (12)
where X is a set of rm characteristics and Y is a set of CEO characteristics. We also include
industry and year xed eects, which we do not tabulate.
Table 10 reports the estimated coecients. In accordance with our hypothesis, Community
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has a highly signicant eect on the probability of a CEO being single, controlling for all of
the rm and CEO characteristics (including, in particular, CEO age and wealth, which both
have predictably negative eects). Thus, variation in divorce laws represents a useful instru-
ment for CEO marital status, and in fact a rather strong one, as suggested by t-statistics
between 3.25 and 4.41 (calculated using robust standard errors clustered at state level). A
CEO residing in a community property state is 4.9% more likely to be single relative to the
unconditional probability of 16.2%.
We then repeat the regressions for return volatility and for rm investment (given by Eq.
(9)) using a two-stage least squares approach, where we substitute the tted value from the
rst stage regression described above, SinglePred, for the endogenous variable Single. We
report the results for our two main dependent variables: idiosyncratic stock return volatility
and total rm investment.
Table 11 presents the second stage regression results for idiosyncratic volatility of rms'
stock returns. The eect of the instrumented variable, SinglePred, is always strongly sig-
nicant, regardless of specication, with t-statistics of 2.5 and above. Table 12 reports the
second stage results for total investment, following the same specications as in Table 5.
Again, the eect of the instrumented variable, SinglePred, is strong and statistically signi-
cant, with t-statistics between 1.88 and 2.99. In both cases, the inclusion of controls does not
have much eect on the coecient, except when all of the rm-level controls are dropped.
Overall, these results conrm the eect of marital status on rm risk-taking that is consis-
tent with our model. The instrumental variable approach helps rule out innate heterogeneity
among CEOs that is correlated with marital status as an explanation of our results. It also
potentially strengthens our results by reducing the eect of measurement error that arises
from our classication of CEOs into \single" and \married."
4.3 State-level Variation
One potential source of concern regarding our instrumental variable approach is the possibility
that our instrument is systematically correlated with variation in rm investment opportu-
nities across states. Most of the rms in our sample are fairly large companies operating at
the national level, so that the economic activity in the state where their headquarters are
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located is unlikely to drive their investment opportunities. Nevertheless, as we do not have
data on the geographic composition of rms' investment, we cannot rule out this possibility
directly. Instead, we attempt to control for state-level variation in investment opportunities
using state-level macroeconomic variables.23
We use the following variables to capture state-level economic activity: the annual growth
rate in nonfarm payroll employment (Payroll) and the in-state Coincident Economic Activity
Index constructed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (CEAI), as well as the
logarithm of real per capital income (LogIncomeState). Column (6) of Table 10 shows that
adding these variables as controls in the rst-stage regression does not have an eect, with
none of the three coecients being signicant.
Column (6) in Tables 12 and 11 present the second-stage results for investment and
idiosyncratic volatility, respectively, using the full set of controls, including the state-level
ones. Our results are not altered by the inclusion of these controls. The only statistically
signicant state-level coecient is that of LogIncomeState on investment, indicating that
rms headquartered in states with higher per capita income on average invest more. At
the same time, the eect of the state-level economic activity index, while not statistically
signicant, is negative. Overall, we conclude that our instrumental variable results are not
likely to be due to dierences in economic conditions across states.
5 Conclusion
There is substantial evidence in economics that interpersonal comparisons are important
for individual subjective well-being (e.g., Luttmer (2005), Dynan and Ravina (2007)) and
that such comparisons aect consumption choices (Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (2009)).
Less is known empirically about the impact of relative wealth concerns on attitudes towards
risk. In this paper, we consider the implications of models in which status concerns arise
endogenously as a result of competition in markets where allocations are not mediated by
prices, such as the marriage market. In our model, complementarity between wealth and
spouse quality induces single individuals to take on (idiosyncratic) risk in hopes of securing a
23The OLS results reported in Section 3 are robust to the inclusion of state xed eects. Clearly, we cannot
include these in the IV estimation due to the cross-sectional nature of our instrument.
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desirable mate. In particular, the model predicts that single individuals take more risk than
married ones.
We use risk-taking by corporate CEOs as a setting for testing the model's predictions.
CEOs represent the upper tail of the wealth distribution (Kaplan and Rauh (2010)), where
status concerns are likely to be most acute. Moreover, their management decisions have
signicant economic impact. We nd that single CEOs invest more aggressively (in capital
expenditures, R&D, advertising, and acquisitions) and that their companies exhibit higher
stock return volatility (controlling for a variety of personal and rm characteristics). These
eects are not only statistically signicant, but also economically important. Our results
are strengthened when we adopt an instrumental variable approach, based on variation in
divorce laws across U.S. states. This variation is likely exogenous to rm investment and
return volatility, but has a strong eect on the probability of a CEO being married, holding
all else equal, and consequently on the measures of rm risk-taking.
In sum, our evidence supports the view that status concerns are important for nancial
decisions, and lead individuals to assume more risk. These ndings have potentially rich im-
plications in both corporate nance and asset pricing. In corporate nance, status concerns
may help mitigate the potential underinvestment in risky projects and ineciently high corre-
lation with common shocks that are the consequences of risk aversion and moral hazard (since
common shocks are more easily observable and can also be hedged by agents - Holmstrom
(1982), Acharya and Bisin (2009)). This mitigating eect of status may play a signicant
role in various models of CEO compensation and, more generally, corporate governance.
It may also help explain the mixed evidence in support of the hypothesis by Shleifer and
Vishny (1986) that concentrated ownership leads to inecient over-diversication of tightly-
held rms (e.g., Anderson and Reeb (2003) nd the opposite result for family-controlled
rms). In asset pricing, it may help reconcile the high investor risk aversion implied by the
large risk premia on publicly traded assets with evidence of poor diversication of individ-
ual households' portfolios as well as with large amounts of idiosyncratic risk taken on by
entrepreneurs.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A. Risk-taking measures
Investment CapEx R&D Advertising Net Acq. Vol. Id. vol.
Married CEOs
Mean 0.90 0.27 0.25 0.08 0.24 0.37 0.34
Median 0.36 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.28
1st. Perct. -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.31 0.00 0.09
99th Perct. 11.25 1.69 4.50 1.63 6.31 3.72 1.12
N 21,876 21,876 21,876 21,876 21,876 20,433 20,418
Single CEOs
Mean 1.52 0.32 0.58 0.12 0.38 0.45 0.42
Median 0.48 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.34
1st. Perct. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.29 0.07 0.11
99th Perct. 19.85 2.04 8.86 3.94 9.51 9.51 1.41
N 4,224 4,224 4,224 4,224 4,224 3,786 3,785
Panel B. Control variables
Assets M/B CF Leverage Firm Age CEO Age Tenure Wealth
Married CEOs
Mean 12,517 1.94 0.54 0.36 25.6 55.0 5.1 166
Median 1,615 1.46 0.39 0.35 22.0 55.0 4.0 16
1st. Perct. 47 0.79 -5.30 0.00 3.0 38.0 0.0 0
99th Perct. 208,335 8.85 8.38 1.27 57.0 77.0 24.0 1,853
N 21,856 21,876 21,876 21,876 21,876 20,885 21,876 16,531
Single CEOs
Mean 2,076 2.14 0.31 0.30 18.5 52.6 4.5 36
Median 595 1.56 0.37 0.25 13.0 53.0 3.0 8
1st. Perct. 26 0.69 -12.20 0.00 3.0 36.0 0.0 0
99th Perct. 24,563 10.82 17.42 1.57 57.0 70.0 22 360
N 4220 4,224 4,224 4,224 4,224 3,960 4,224 2,969
Panel A reports the summary statistics for various measures of rm risk-taking. Investment (Investment)
and its components (CapEx, R&D, Advertising, and NetAcquisitions) are relative to PP&E. Volatility is
the (annualized) standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the previous year. Idiosyncratic volatility
is the standard deviation of residuals from the regression of stock returns on the market return.
Panel B reports the summary statistics for our main control variables. Firm assets (A) and CEO wealth
(Wealth) are expressed in millions. Market-to-book ratio (M=B) is the ratio of the market value of assets to
their book value. Cash ow (CF ) equals earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation & amortiza-
tion, scaled by net PP&E. Book leverage (Leverage) equals the sum of long-term and current debt divided
by the sum of long-term debt, current debt, and book equity. Firm age (Firm Age) is computed with respect
to the rst year it appears in COMPUSTAT (expressed in years, as are CEO age and tenure).
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Table 2: CEO Marital Status: A Diagnostic
1 2 3 4 5
Intercept 2.455 1.452 2.396 2.391 1.410
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net Worth -0.032 -0.018
(0.000) (0.000)
Largest Asset -0.018 -0.011
(0.000) (0.001)
Income -0.488 -0.279 -0.080
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.130 -0.121 -0.125 -0.126 -0.118
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2=100 0.125 0.113 0.119 0.121 0.111
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pr(SinglejMedianCEO) 0.203 0.117 0.122 0.149 0.113
This table presents the results of logit regressions of marital status on measures of wealth, income, and age:
Pr (Single) = 

+  Wealth+   Income+  Age+   Age
2
100

;
where  is the logistic c.d.f. Data is from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances. Specications (1) and (4)
use Net Worth as a measure of wealth in the SCF, while specications (2) and (5) use the value of the single
largest risky asset holding (Largest Asset) as a proxy for wealth. We also show the implied probability of
a median CEO being single based on these estimates. The implied probabilities are computed based on the
median CEO wealth of $13:8 million (using CEO's holdings of company stock and options), median CEO
income of $2:2 million, and median CEO age of 55 years.
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Table 3: Regression Results for Total Stock Return Volatility
1 2 3 4 5 6
CFt -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
(-6.430) (-5.694) (-5.753) (-5.781) (-6.810)
Mt 1=Bt 1 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.000
(3.938) (3.200) (3.016) (3.074) (0.210)
logAt 1 -0.022 -0.022 -0.024 -0.023 -0.022
(-10.978) (-10.546) (-9.768) (-9.892) (-9.120)
Leveraget 0.077 0.071 0.072 0.072 0.097
(8.708) (7.975) (7.977) (8.002) (10.130)
V olt 1 0.408 0.405 0.404 0.401 0.387
(9.523) (8.891) (8.850) (8.659) (7.930)
FirmAge -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-6.678) (-6.428) (-6.384) (-6.436) (-7.320)
Single 0.012 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.067
(2.640) (1.761) (2.054) (2.303) (2.320) (7.827)
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004
(-4.114) (-3.781) (-3.842) (-3.470) (-11.458)
Age Single -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(-1.460) (-1.452) (-1.530) (-1.520) (-1.188)
Tenure -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.877) (-1.992) (-2.300) (-2.340) (-1.021)
Tenure Single 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.000
(0.693) (0.610) (0.843) (1.800) (-0.198)
CEOProminence 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.007
(3.115) (3.152) (2.750) (-4.556)
FirmProminence -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.962) (-0.972) (-1.190)
Inst -0.034 -0.045
(-3.789) (-4.710)
Inst Single -0.061 -0.054
(-1.951) (-1.610)
R2 0.481 0.482 0.482 0.484 0.512 0.196
The table reports coecient estimates of the following OLS regression:
V ol =  +   Single+  X +   Y +   (Single ~Y );
where V ol is the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the previous year, Single is a
dummy variable equaling one if the CEO is unmarried and zero otherwise, X is a set of rm characteristics,
and Y is a set of CEO characteristics (the specic variable denitions are given in Section 2), demeaned when
used in interaction terms: ~Y = Y   E^Y . All specications also include industry (based on the Fama-French
49-industry classication) and year xed eects (unreported), with the exception of specication (5), which
includes industryyear xed eects. T-statistics are in parentheses, and are computed using robust standard
errors clustered by rm.
44
Table 4: Regression Results for Idiosyncratic Return Volatility
1 2 3 4 5 6
CFt -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(-5.488) (-4.816) (-4.885) (-4.858) (-4.200)
Mt 1=Bt 1 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002
(0.890) (0.233) (0.011) (0.049) (-1.680)
logAt 1 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 -0.027 -0.027
(-12.689) (-12.330) (-11.506) (-11.719) (-11.850)
Leveraget 0.082 0.078 0.078 0.079 0.085
(9.644) (8.988) (9.010) (9.104) (9.690)
IdV olt 1 0.346 0.341 0.340 0.335 0.327
(8.197) (7.637) (7.608) (7.357) (7.260)
FirmAge -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-6.853) (-6.627) (-6.572) (-6.702) (-7.200)
Single 0.012 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.063
(2.667) (1.927) (2.236) (2.551) (2.520) (8.085)
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004
(-3.927) (-3.551) (-3.654) (-3.710) (-11.370)
Age Single -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.278) (-1.271) (-1.371) (-1.310) (-0.960)
Tenure -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(-1.609) (-1.733) (-2.169) (-2.070) (-0.819)
Tenure Single 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.131) (0.038) (0.352) (0.230) (-0.464)
CEOProminence 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.008
(3.298) (3.365) (2.890) (-6.177)
FirmProminence -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.913) (-0.934) (-0.640)
Inst -0.047 -0.050
(-5.269) (-5.590)
Inst Single -0.076 -0.064
(-2.253) (-1.930)
R2 0.443 0.442 0.443 0.445 0.482 0.189
The table reports coecient estimates of the following OLS regression:
IdV ol = +   Single+  X +   Y +   (Single ~Y );
where IdV ol is the annualized standard deviation of residuals from the regression of rm monthly stock
returns on the market return, Single is a dummy variable equaling one if the CEO is unmarried and zero
otherwise, X is a set of rm characteristics, and Y is a set of CEO characteristics (the specic variable
denitions are given in Section 2), demeaned when used in interaction terms: ~Y = Y   E^Y . All speci-
cations also include industry (based on the Fama-French 49-industry classication) and year xed eects
(unreported), with the exception of specication (5), which includes industryyear xed eects. T-statistics
are in parentheses, and are computed using robust standard errors clustered by rm.
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Table 5: Regression Results for Total Investment
1 2 3 4 5 6
CFt 0.091 0.096 0.095 0.095 0.094
(5.551) (5.941) (5.882) (5.878) (5.710)
Mt 1=Bt 1 0.118 0.114 0.108 0.108 0.109
(7.894) (7.676) (7.363) (7.349) (7.340)
logAt 1 -0.128 -0.131 -0.151 -0.154 -0.145
(-11.844) (-11.847) (-11.335) (-11.745) (-11.170)
Leveraget 0.195 0.188 0.198 0.198 0.205
(3.525) (3.328) (3.498) (3.506) (3.660)
Investmentt 1 0.484 0.476 0.475 0.475 0.477
(18.104) (19.099) (19.043) (18.980) (18.940)
FirmAge -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-3.071) (-2.418) (-2.350) (-2.273) (-2.720)
Single 0.093 0.069 0.090 0.087 0.105 0.453
(2.349) (1.712) (2.249) (2.181) (2.650) (5.234)
Age -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.029
(-2.782) (-2.114) (-2.072) (-2.700) (-9.768)
Age Single -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.017 -0.042
(-2.613) (-2.631) (-2.638) (-2.440) (-2.928)
Tenure -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007
(-3.727) (-3.920) (-3.875) (-3.410) (-1.262)
Tenure Single 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.039
(1.440) (1.372) (1.389) (1.320) (1.474)
CEOProminence 0.035 0.035 0.032 -0.002
(3.832) (3.842) (3.550) (-0.186)
FirmProminence 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.405) (0.416) (0.350)
Inst 0.133 0.121
(1.849) (1.680)
Inst Single 0.022 0.019
(0.103) (0.090)
R2 0.445 0.444 0.445 0.445 0.463 0.043
The table reports coecient estimates of the following OLS regression:
Investment =  +   Single+  X +   Y +   (Single ~Y );
where Investment is capital expenditures plus acquisitions minus asset sales plus R&D expenditure plus
advertising expenditure (scaled by net property, plant & equipment), Single is a dummy variable equaling
one if the CEO is unmarried and zero otherwise, X is a set of rm characteristics, and Y is a set of CEO
characteristics (the specic variable denitions are given in Section 2), demeaned when used in interaction
terms: ~Y = Y   E^Y . All specications also include industry (based on the Fama-French 49-industry
classication) and year xed eects (unreported), with the exception of specication (5), which includes
industryyear xed eects. T-statistics are in parentheses, and are computed using robust standard errors
clustered by rm.
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Table 6: Regression Results for Net Acquisitions
1 2 3 4 5 6
CF 0.069 0.070 0.070 0.069 0.071
(10.620) (10.215) (10.194) (10.145) (10.130)
Mt 1=Bt 1 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.016
(2.370) (2.344) (2.167) (2.177) (2.280)
logAt 1 -0.046 -0.047 -0.050 -0.053 -0.049
(-8.394) (-8.566) (-8.133) (-8.570) (-7.820)
Leverage 0.242 0.250 0.251 0.252 0.266
(7.438) (7.409) (7.405) (7.424) (7.760)
NetAcqt 1 0.239 0.237 0.237 0.236 0.230
(13.332) (13.135) (13.147) (13.069) (13.130)
FirmAge -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-3.109) (-2.718) (-2.683) (-2.530) (-2.790)
Single 0.035 0.035 0.039 0.038 0.048 0.095
(1.415) (1.347) (1.482) (1.452) (1.900) (2.587)
Age -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.005
(-0.621) (-0.414) (-0.312) (-0.920) (-3.741)
Age Single -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.012
(-1.753) (-1.749) (-1.762) (-1.600) (-2.276)
Tenure -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(-2.107) (-2.162) (-2.160) (-1.640) (-1.257)
Tenure Single 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.021
(1.655) (1.640) (1.653) (1.610) (1.844)
CEOProminence 0.008 0.008 0.006 -0.014
(1.504) (1.519) (1.230) (-2.587)
FirmProminence -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(-0.217) (-0.178) (-0.320)
Inst 0.182 0.167
(5.048) (4.520)
Inst Single -0.063 -0.080
(-0.558) (-0.720)
R2 0.150 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.179 0.014
The table reports coecient estimates of the following OLS regression:
NetAcq =  +   Single+  X +   Y +   (Single ~Y );
where NetAcq is acquisitions minus asset sales (scaled by net property, plant & equipment), Single is a
dummy variable equaling one if the CEO is unmarried and zero otherwise, X is a set of rm characteristics,
and Y is a set of CEO characteristics (the specic variable denitions are given in Section 2), demeaned when
used in interaction terms: ~Y = Y   E^Y . All specications also include industry (based on the Fama-French
49-industry classication) and year xed eects (unreported), with the exception of specication (5), which
includes industryyear xed eects. T-statistics are in parentheses, and are computed using robust standard
errors clustered by rm.
47
Table 7: Regression Results for R&D and Advertising
1 2 3 4 5 6
CFt 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008
(1.592) (1.684) (1.644) (1.640) (1.410)
Mt 1=Bt 1 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012
(2.787) (2.397) (2.155) (2.144) (2.240)
logAt 1 -0.026 -0.028 -0.033 -0.033 -0.030
(-6.738) (-6.822) (-6.739) (-6.862) (-6.540)
Leveraget -0.019 -0.025 -0.023 -0.023 -0.029
(-1.125) (-1.422) (-1.303) (-1.304) (-1.690)
NetAcqt 1 0.806 0.800 0.799 0.799 0.801
(39.609) (38.798) (38.546) (38.576) (39.110)
FirmAge -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(-0.587) (0.019) (0.098) (0.115) (-0.310)
Single 0.033 0.024 0.029 0.029 0.032 0.324
(2.598) (1.932) (2.402) (2.228) (2.590) (5.667)
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.016
(-1.966) (-1.393) (-1.395) (-2.100) (-8.702)
Age Single -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.024
(-1.879) (-1.886) (-1.880) (-1.630) (-2.478)
Tenure -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003
(-2.597) (-2.769) (-2.694) (-2.070) (-1.143)
Tenure Single 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.013
(0.541) (0.475) (0.446) (0.240) (0.713)
CEOProminence 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.016
(3.233) (3.226) (3.040) (2.148)
FirmProminence 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.198) (0.192) (0.190)
Inst -0.000 -0.003
(-0.014) (-0.130)
Inst Single 0.032 0.031
(0.382) (0.380)
R2 0.765 0.761 0.761 0.761 0.770 0.048
The table reports coecient estimates of the following OLS regression:
R&D + Advertising =  +   Single+  X +   Y +   (Single ~Y );
where R&D + Advertising is R&D expenditure plus advertising expenditure (scaled by net property, plant
& equipment), Single is a dummy variable equaling one if the CEO is unmarried and zero otherwise, X
is a set of rm characteristics, and Y is a set of CEO characteristics (the specic variable denitions are
given in Section 2), demeaned when used in interaction terms: ~Y = Y   E^Y . All specications also include
industry (based on the Fama-French 49-industry classication) and year xed eects (unreported), with the
exception of specication (5), which includes industryyear xed eects. T-statistics are in parentheses, and
are computed using robust standard errors clustered by rm.
48
Table 8: Eect of Idiosyncratic Risk on Investment: Within-Firm Evidence
1 2 3 4 5
CFt 0.101 0.100 0.103 0.103
(16.110) (15.850) (15.590) (15.600)
Mt 1=Bt 1 0.207 0.206 0.198 0.199
(21.240) (21.120) (19.570) (19.610)
logAt 1 -0.334 -0.341 -0.348 -0.347
(-15.680) (-15.960) (-15.640) (-15.580)
Leveraget 0.745 0.762 0.757 0.757
(12.540) (12.820) (12.220) (12.220)
Investmentt 1 0.082 0.082 0.074 0.074
(12.690) (12.580) (10.970) (10.970)
FirmAge 0.043 0.038 0.038 0.039
(14.200) (11.800) (10.440) (10.500)
Single -0.043 -0.043 -0.048 -0.037 -0.026
(-1.090) (-1.110) (-1.260) (-0.900) (-0.600)
Age -0.003 -0.003
(-1.600) (-1.380)
Age Single -0.003
(-0.450)
Tenure 0.002 0.001
(0.620) (0.170)
Tenure Single 0.010
(1.220)
CEOProminence -0.009 -0.019 -0.019
(-0.910) (-1.730) (-1.760)
FirmProminence -0.016 -0.013 -0.013
(-1.050) (-0.810) (-0.790)
Inst 0.349 0.338 0.337
(4.950) (4.660) (4.650)
IdV olt 1 -0.175 -0.330 -0.290 -0.288 -0.289
(-3.100) (-5.940) (-5.180) (-4.940) (-4.950)
IdV olt 1  Single 0.216 0.309 0.291 0.312 0.319
(2.250) (3.320) (3.130) (3.220) (3.270)
The table reports coecient estimates of the following OLS regression:
Investmentt =  +   Single+   IdV olt 1 +   (Single gIdV olt 1) +  X;
where Investment is our measure of total investment in Table 5 andX is a set of rm and CEO characteristics.
All variables are demeaned when used in interaction terms (e.g.: gIdV olt 1 = IdV olt 1   E^IdV olt 1). All
specications also include rm and year xed eects (unreported). T-statistics are in parentheses.
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Table 9: Validating the Instrument: Marital Status and Divorce Law in the U.S.
1 2 3 4
Intercept 1.252 1.185 1.182 1.181
(260.000) (220.560) (220.160) (219.970)
Comm -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(-5.730) (-4.330) (-4.180) (-4.190)
Income -0.415 -1.374 -1.274 -1.240
(-38.130) (-79.080) (-83.330) (-82.170)
Age -0.037 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031
(-205.780) (-142.400) (-142.480) (-142.440)
Age2 0.027 0.030 0.030 0.030
(177.880) (152.280) (152.430) (152.380)
Occ -0.005 -0.084
(-0.680) (-10.790)
Comm Income 0.193 0.349
(9.390) (11.070)
CommOcc 0.041 0.018
(3.090) (1.280)
This table presents the results of an OLS regressions of marital status on measures of income as well as
their interactions with the legal regime guiding division of marital assets in divorce in the state of residence,
controlling for age, using the data from the 2000 U.S. Census 5% sample from the Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series (IPUMS). The regression specication is
Single = +Comm+Income+Age+Age
2
100
+Occ+ gIncomeComm+gOccComm;
where Comm is the dummy variable equal to one if the household's state of residence is a community property
state. Single is a dummy variable equal to one if the head of household has never been married (specication
1) or has never been married, is divorced, or is widowed (specications 2-4). Income is in millions. Occ is a
dummy variable for whether the head of household is either a lawyer or a surgeon/physician by occupation
(specication 3) or a chief executive (specication 4). The interacted variables gIncome and gOcc are demeaned
using population weights. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses.
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Table 10: Predicting CEO Marital Status with Divorce Law Instrument
1 2 3 4 5 6
Community 0.050 0.048 0.049 0.049 0.059 0.046
(3.740) (3.510) (3.610) (3.580) (4.410) (3.250)
CFt -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001
(-1.860) (-0.930) (-0.870) (-0.910) (-0.320)
Mt 1=Bt 1 -0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(-2.170) (-0.260) (0.340) (0.330) (0.290)
logAt 1 -0.041 -0.027 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016
(-11.050) (-7.000) (-3.710) (-3.910) (-3.670)
Leveraget 1 0.018 -0.010 -0.014 -0.015 -0.011
(0.800) (-0.410) (-0.620) (-0.640) (-0.480)
IdV olt 1 0.037 0.020 0.029 0.031 0.035
(1.740) (0.870) (1.320) (1.440) (1.620)
Investmentt 1 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
(2.950) (2.640) (2.820) (2.800) (2.640)
FirmAge -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-3.260) (-3.840) (-3.730) (-3.670) (-3.680)
Age -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(-2.900) (-3.780) (-3.760) (-5.450) (-4.050)
Tenure -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-1.400) (-1.350) (-1.330) (-1.430) (-1.630)
Wealth -0.021 -0.017 -0.017 -0.020 -0.019
(-7.220) (-5.810) (-5.780) (-7.250) (-6.180)
CEOProminence -0.021 -0.021 -0.031 -0.022
(-5.370) (-5.370) (-10.570) (-5.610)
FirmProminence -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(-0.720) (-0.710) (-0.660)
Inst 0.040 0.033
(1.540) (1.300)
Payroll 0.069
(0.100)
CEAI -0.121
(-0.280)
LogIncomeState 0.055
(1.200)
R2 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.11
The table reports coecient estimates of the following OLS regression:
Single =  +   Community +  X +   Y +   Z;
where Single is a dummy variable equaling one if the CEO is unmarried and zero otherwise, Community
is a dummy variable equaling one if the rm is headquartered in a community property state and zero
otherwise, X is a set of rm characteristics, Y is a set of CEO characteristics, and Z is a set of state-level
control variables (the specic variable denitions are given in Sections 2 and 4.3). All specications also
include industry (based on the Fama-French 49-industry classication) and year xed eects (unreported).
T-statistics are in parentheses, and are computed using robust standard errors clustered by state.
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Table 11: IV Results for Idiosyncratic Volatility
1 2 3 4 5 6
CFt -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
(-3.210) (-3.270) (-3.470) (-3.260) (-3.830)
Mt 1=Bt 1 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.810) (1.130) (0.580) (0.660) (0.520)
logAt 1 -0.015 -0.017 -0.022 -0.020 -0.020
(-3.340) (-4.920) (-7.760) (-7.290) (-7.490)
Leveraget 0.077 0.078 0.079 0.080 0.079
(11.500) (11.180) (10.990) (10.920) (11.330)
IdV olt 1 0.331 0.330 0.326 0.321 0.318
(7.610) (7.020) (6.910) (6.730) (6.670)
FirmAge -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-1.970) (-1.370) (-1.540) (-1.590) (-1.460)
SinglePred 0.297 0.308 0.301 0.316 0.643 0.330
(2.680) (2.480) (2.570) (2.560) (2.660) (2.730)
Age -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.330) (0.380) (0.390) (0.140) (0.470)
Tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(1.130) (0.980) (0.960) (1.800) (1.400)
Wealth 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002
(0.980) (0.480) (0.460) (0.080) (0.710)
CEOProminence 0.010 0.011 0.013 0.011
(4.410) (4.390) (1.910) (4.540)
FirmProminence -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.300) (-0.350) (-0.350)
Inst -0.075 -0.075
(-4.880) (-5.000)
Payroll 0.108
(0.350)
CEAI 0.190
(0.640)
LogIncomeState 0.003
(0.190)
R2 0.443 0.442 0.442 0.444 0.301 0.444
The table reports coecient estimates of the following OLS regression:
IdV ol =  +   SinglePred+  X +   Y +   Z;
where IdV ol is the annualized standard deviation of residuals from the regression of rm monthly stock
returns on the market return, SinglePred is the predicted value for Single computed using coecient
estimates for the corresponding specication in Table 10, X is a set of rm characteristics, Y is a set of
CEO characteristics, and Z is a set of state-level control variables (the specic variable denitions are given
in Sections 2 and 4.3). All specications also include industry (based on the Fama-French 49-industry
classication) and year xed eects (unreported). T-statistics are in parentheses, and are computed using
robust standard errors clustered by state, taking into account the uncertainty in rst-stage estimates.
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Table 12: IV Results for Total Investment
1 2 3 4 5 6
CFt 0.109 0.109 0.108 0.108 0.109
(6.110) (5.350) (5.410) (5.370) (5.600)
Mt 1=Bt 1 0.135 0.103 0.096 0.096 0.096
(9.940) (7.890) (7.850) (7.870) (7.070)
logAt 1 -0.030 -0.083 -0.122 -0.123 -0.128
(-0.800) (-2.980) (-5.890) (-5.840) (-6.440)
Leveraget 0.148 0.245 0.255 0.255 0.292
(2.330) (4.550) (4.900) (4.920) (5.420)
Investmentt 1 0.470 0.464 0.463 0.463 0.456
(18.890) (20.690) (20.220) (20.160) (18.780)
FirmAge 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.720) (1.200) (1.200) (1.210) (1.610)
SinglePred 2.299 2.197 2.114 2.107 5.367 2.357
(2.560) (2.260) (2.440) (2.380) (1.880) (2.990)
Age -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.000
(-1.130) (-0.350) (-0.350) (-0.450) (-0.080)
Tenure -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.003
(-0.910) (-1.180) (-1.170) (0.250) (-1.130)
Wealth 0.073 0.059 0.059 0.155 0.071
(3.600) (3.690) (3.690) (2.670) (4.280)
CEOProminence 0.076 0.075 0.134 0.076
(4.210) (4.150) (1.610) (4.930)
FirmProminence 0.004 0.004 0.009
(0.360) (0.360) (0.830)
Inst 0.020 0.047
(0.190) (0.570)
Payroll 0.641
(0.270)
CEAI -1.448
(-0.770)
LogIncomeState 0.285
(2.300)
R2 0.446 0.445 0.445 0.445 0.170 0.450
The table reports coecient estimates of the following OLS regression:
Investment =  +   SinglePred+  X +   Y +   Z;
where Investment is capital expenditures plus acquisitions minus asset sales plus R&D expenditure plus
advertising expenditure (scaled by net property, plant & equipment), SinglePred is the predicted value for
Single computed using coecient estimates for the corresponding specication in Table 10, X is a set of rm
characteristics, Y is a set of CEO characteristics, and Z is a set of state-level control variables (the specic
variable denitions are given in Sections 2 and 4.3). All specications also include industry (based on the
Fama-French 49-industry classication) and year xed eects (unreported). T-statistics are in parentheses,
and are computed using robust standard errors clustered by state, taking into account the uncertainty in
rst-stage estimates.
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